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ABSTRACT: Elements of the Communist concept of command
continue to ramify throughout Central and Eastern European
armed forces. They inhibit the orderly delegation of command,
the consistent creation of defense capabilities, and the professional
development of commanders and managers; they also impede these
armed services from adopting the concepts of authority, accountability, and responsibility—concepts taken for granted in Western
defense institutions.

A

n optimistic view of military leadership in the defense institutions of Central and Eastern European post-Communist
countries prevails among Western officials and influences many
of their decisions to support new allies in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Since most of these European countries have
deployed forces in combat and peace-support operations with NATO
after the Cold War, and many have received positive reviews, these
assumptions are understandable.1 Many Western leaders also presume
commanders of post-Communist nations who have been exposed to
Western philosophies of command during combined operations and
the introduction of modern Western combat platforms and systems
will naturally adopt similar practices of accountability and responsibility
in their own organizations. This article examines the contrast of such
contemporary expectations in the context of a trinity of Communist
legacy command concepts: collective decision-making to avoid personal
responsibility; conflating leadership, command, and management; and
hypercentralized decision-making.2
Leaders in Central and Eastern Europe have yet to appreciate the
effects of this trinity on the adoption of delegated decision-making on
the development of a merit-based officer and noncommissioned officer
corps and on the sustentation of Central and Eastern European military
capabilities when they assess the viability of their armed forces under
the shadow of Russia’s new adventurism. Interest also piques when discerning the challenges that have occurred during recent modernization
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the policy or
views of the Naval Postgraduate School, Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense.
The writer would like to express his sincere gratitude to Glen Grant, Vladimir Milenski, and Bence
Nemeth for their superb comments on earlier versions of this manuscript
1 James S. Corum, Development of the Baltic Armed Forces in Light of Multinational Deployments
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), 34–38.
2 See Thomas-Durell Young, Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of
Military Modernity (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017); Thomas-Durell Young, “The Challenge
of Reforming European Communist Legacy ‘Logistics’,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 3
(2016): 352–70, doi:10.1080/13518046.2016.1200376; and Thomas-Durell Young, “Impediments
to Reform in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: Addressing the Conceptual Divide,”
Problems of Post-Communism (2016): 1–14, doi:10.1080/10758216.2016.1220256.
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efforts. With some exceptions such as Yugoslavia’s republic-based territorial defense forces, post-Communist defense organizations come from
a conceptual legacy whereby all decision-making was highly centralized
and quite different from Western mission command philosophies.3
Thus, integrating Western weapons systems and platforms, designed to
require critical thinking and decentralized operation, is formidable. The
Polish Air Force provides an apt example: they acquired F-16s in 2006,
declared them operational in 2012, deployed them on operations for the
first time during the summer of 2016, and scheduled their first Baltic Air
Policing mission for May 2017.4
The omission of similar Central and Eastern European defense institutions’ preparedness to absorb more Western equipment, training, and
exercises, let alone effectively use such resources, is not fully appreciated
by Western leaders. In March 2016, for instance, US Air Force General
Philip M. Breedlove, who was then commander of the US European
Command, presented a comprehensive review of the state of security
and defense in Europe to the US Senate Armed Services Committee.5
Yet, his testimony in no way suggested a need to address the conceptual
and philosophical foundations of these defense institutions. Thus, one
can only conclude US planning and managing of military and defense
advice and assistance to these critical allies is premised on the unchallenged, and indeed dubious, assumption that these organizations hold
Western philosophies of command and governance.
The anatomy of post-Communist defense institutions in the context
of organizational sociology, however, reveals strong political, institutional, cultural, and indeed, sociological influences that inhibit the
adoption of basic Western concepts of defense governance. These legacy
practices produce organizational pathologies which prevent delegating
command authority in a planned and predictable fashion, producing
defense capabilities, and developing commanders and managers at
all levels. Although, these challenges cannot be solved using Western
technical and educational programs alone, ignoring these command
pathologies perpetuates Central and Eastern European military weaknesses and makes them vulnerable to opportunistic Russian mischief.

3 For more on mission command, see Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA),
Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, Field Manual (FM) 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA,
2015).
4 Lukáš Dyčka and Miroslav Mareš, “The Development and Future of Fighter Planes
Acquisitions in Countries of the Visegrad Group,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25, no. 4
(2012): 544–46, 555, doi:10.1080/13518046.2012.730370; Remigiusz Wilk, “Polish F-16s
Deploy for First-Ever Combat Operation,” IHS Jane’s 360, July 7, 2016, http://www.janes.com
/article/62046/polish-f-16s-deploy-for-first-ever-combat-operation; and Jacek Siminski, “Polish
F-16s Prepare To Take Part in NATO Baltic Air Patrol Mission for the Very First Time,” Aviationist,
February 23, 2017, https://theaviationist.com/2017/02/23/polish-f-16s-prepare-to-take-part-in
-nato-baltic-air-patrol-mission-for-the-very-first-time/.
5 Hearing to Receive Testimony on Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Assistance Programs
and Authorities, Before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 114th
Congress (March 9, 2016) (statement of General Philip M. Breedlove, commander US Forces
Europe); and Examining DOD Security Cooperation: When It Works and When It Doesn’t Before the US
House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services,” 114th Congress (October 21, 2015).
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Table 1. Understanding Western and Communist Legacy Command Concepts6
Mission Command

Versus

Detailed Command

Unpredictable
Disorder/Uncertainty
Decentralization
Informality
Loose rein on subordinates
Self-discipline
Initiative
Cooperation
Ability at all echelons
Higher tempo
Implicit
Vertical/Horizontal
Interactive and Networked
Organic
Ad hoc
Delegate
Art of war

Assumes war is
Accepts
Tends to lead to

Predictable
Order/Certainty
Centralization
Formality
Tight rein on subordinates
Imposed discipline
Obedience
Compliance
Ability only at the top
Stasis
Explicit
Vertical
Reactive and Linear
Hierarchic
Bureaucratic
Disempower and Direct
Science of war

Types of communications
Organization types fostered
Leadership styles
Appropriate to

Collective Decision-Making

Communist governance separated decision-making from accountability via collectivization. Various ministries actualized this managerial
practice by forming collegia. These groups were perfect ideological
expressions of collectivization as they removed an individual from any
responsibility for the collegium’s decisions. In addition to removing the
principle of individual accountability from governance and management,
these bodies facilitated anonymous, arbitrary meddling at the expert
level. In contrast, Western organizations encourage staffs to consult,
coordinate, and recommend, while only senior officials, or commanders,
make decisions.
Despite their dubious political provenance, collegia such as Ukraine’s
military collegium and Moldova’s military council persist throughout
former Soviet republics.7 Rarer in former Warsaw Pact defense institutions, such governing organizations existed until recently in Slovakia
and Hungary, and arguably still exist in Bulgaria.8 These bodies still

6 I am indebted to Major General Walter Holmes, Canadian Army (Ret), for permission to use
the chart he developed, which also appears in Young, “Impediments to Reform.”
7 Ben Lombardi, “Ukrainian Armed Forces: Defence Expenditure and Military Reform,” Journal
of Slavic Military Studies 14, no. 3 (2001): 32, doi:10.1080/13518040108430487.
8 A Slovakian think tank advocated for regular consultations between the president and the chief
of defense, as well as the minister of defense’s collegium to enable more informed decision-making.
See Jaroslav Naď, Marian Majer and Milan Šuplata, 75 Solutions for Slovakia’s Defence (Bratislava:
Central European Policy Institute, 2015), 2; and Réka Szemerkényi, Central European Civil-Military
Reforms at Risk, Adelphi Paper 306 (Oxford: Oxford University Press / International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1996), 13, 15. The Collegium of the Minister began during the Communist period.
As the membership of that body and the current defense council remain essentially the same, arguably, its purpose to depersonalize decision-making and escape from responsibility has not changed.
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function extensively, sometimes under disguise or mutation as in the
former Yugoslav Republics.9
In Serbia, for instance, matériel requirement proposals are reviewed
by the minster of defense’s collegium. In the case of Macedonia, its collegium comprises the chief of the general staff, his deputy, the director
of the staff, and the heads of staff directorates and can include representatives from units and, at one point, even the resident NATO training
team. Moreover, many of these countries practice joint meetings of the
collegia of the ministry of defense and general staff or, alternately, the
chief of defense or chief of the general staff attends the minister of
defense’s collegium either regularly or by invitation.
Although not secretive, these bodies obscure senior-level decisionmaking and thereby violate basic Western governance concepts such as
the alignment of authority with accountability. Despite their prevalence,
printed details regarding the constitution of these bodies is difficult
to find, which could explain why some collegia, such as Montenegro’s
do not formally exist by law. Yet, one can gain an appreciation of the
scope of these bodies’ responsibilities in the case of the General Staff
collegium of the Vojska Srbije i Crne Gore (Armed Forces of Serbia
and Montenegro), circa 2002, which were based on the practice of the
Yugoslav People’s Army:
• Analyze the outcome of the general staff’s monthly work plan.
• Analyze combat readiness and determine causation of shortcomings.
• Assess the regional intelligence and security situation and determine
implications for the country.
• Assess the regional security situation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and analyze its possible implications for the combat readiness of the armed forces and the defense of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
• Analyze the financial situation in the armed forces.
• Determine whether there is a need for organizational changes within
the armed forces.
• Manage personnel issues:
 Regulate the condition in the service, promotions, termination of
service, and retention in the service for professional soldiers of
the general’s rank.
 Review and approve the colonel’s promotion list.
 Select candidates for professional military education courses.
 Assign postings of officers completing professional military
education.
 Assign postings of colonels and lieutenant colonels.
 Manage regular promotion in the rank of colonel and all extraordinary promotions for all professional solders.

9 While the title collegium is eschewed, Slovenia continues using boards or committees, some
of which are related to the collegia functions in all but name.
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 Oversee the condition of the service for colonels who are assigned
to mobilization units.
 Determine who should be retained in service as distinguished
experts who meet the requirements for retirement.
 Approve release from service.
 Analyze the personnel management of the armed forces.
• Propose other issues for the attention of the chief of the general staff
at his request.10
Based upon interviews with officials from numerous defense institutions throughout the region, these terms of reference clearly represent
the responsibilities of their own collegium, or defense councils. When
examining the strengths and weaknesses of these bodies, an inevitable
explanation for their continued utilization is that they provide useful
coordination in the absence of the chief of staff concept yet to be fully
embraced throughout the region. Another argument is the group’s ability
to obviate subjectivity, which is important to decision-making such as
assignments and promotions.
What should surprise and disturb Western observers is the power
collegia continue to hold over essentially all aspects of planning and
managing Central and Eastern European armed forces. Notably,
decision-making is limited to colonels and general officers; the views of
others, no matter how well-informed, are not considered. Also vexing is
the continued domination of these ranks in human resource management
decisions, which violates Western defense governance principles. Coming
from a tradition of conscription and an oversized officer corps based on
mobilization, those transitioning and newly formed defense institutions
lack centralized or integrated human resource structures. Except for
the Yugoslav People’s Army, these services also lack noncommissioned
officers with leadership responsibilities.11 Unsurprisingly, these factors
contribute to the legacy practice of using collegia for personnel decisionmaking that extends from individual units up to the general staffs and
the ministries of defense.
Fundamentally, this form of collective decision-making undermines
commanders’ authority to provide professional advice on individuals’
performance and prospects for growth and promotion—inherent
responsibilities of commanders in Western armed forces. In the West,
commanders’ recommendations weigh heavily in independent selection board processes to mitigate against favoritism, let alone nepotism.
Moreover, as Central and Eastern European defense institutions continue to struggle to adopt Western concepts of defense governance,
collegia have not been identified for elimination. By continuing the
practice of collective decision-making, they release senior officials from
accountability and responsibility for their decisions.
One should never underestimate the strength of bureaucratic
inertia, and clearly collegia are unlikely to be retired without considerable
10 General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, Order on Authorities of the Organizational
Units of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Sector for Manning, Mobilization
and Systems Issues, March 20, 2002), section IV (nota bene, translated text).
11 Robert Niebuhr, “Death of the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Wars of Succession,”
Polemos 7, no. 13/14 (January 2004): 93.
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political pressure. Perhaps a first step would be to assess the function
of, and justification for, collegia—for example, Macedonia adopted the
chief of staff principle, which should enable objective evaluation of the
effectiveness of the director of staff function thereby removing a justification for the continued use of its collegia.
A final concern with collegium is most Western officials and analysts are unaware of their existence, which leads to misunderstandings of
the decision-making process, particularly regarding key human resource
management functions. As the underlying organization’s sociology of
decision-making remains misunderstood, Western officials have misdiagnosed the human resource management challenges faced by these
organizations. By superficially defining weak personnel structures and
processes as the challenges, Western officials and analysts have missed
the key organizational sociology cause. The reason human resource
management directorates appear to be underperforming by Western
expectations is due to these relatively new bureaucratic bodies existing
in a parallel bureaucratic universe where power continues to be exercised
by collegia.
Accordingly, human resource management directorates concern
themselves with administration and the exercise of negative control with
hardly any consistent, constructive influence on personnel decisions.
Thus, when reforming this key aspect of management, officials need to
identify collegia as a reality that can only be addressed within the political
context of democratic defense governance. In other words, a bottom-up,
technical approach without strong, supportive messaging from national
leaders will always be stillborn. Within the legacy of detailed command
structures, a directive approach is likely to be much more effective than
using Western national models and modeling delegation.
Even more pressing, Western and allied officials must acknowledge
the deleterious effect collegia have on developing commanders. The
importance of basing performance assessments on the objective assessments by field commanders should be incorporated in efforts to develop
leadership, command, management, and decision-making capabilities of
partner nations. These efforts should encourage serving in units as a
necessary step toward overcoming the current professional strategy of
seeking permanent postings on staffs, where decisions are made and
power over personnel management decisions is highly concentrated.
These current incentives are so misaligned that in some countries, such
as Hungary, officers serving on the general staff are better paid than
those commanding units.12 This perverse incentive discourages officers
from serving in units, ensuring an institutional disconnect among the
general staff, units, and commanders.

Conflating Command and Management

Defense institutions which continue the legacy practice of collective
decision-making suffer from another institutional lacuna within the
context of the Western concept of defense governance. Whereas all of
the Baltic States’ divided leadership and command from management—
the ministries of defense adopted posts for permanent under-secretaries
12 Act CCV of 2012 on the Status of Military Personnel, Hungarian Civil Code, 5th Appendix,
http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1200205.TV (accessed October 27, 2016).
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and the armed forces have directors of staff—this practice is rare, even
in Western-leaning Georgia.13
By conflating leadership and command with management, it is
essentially impossible for a policy framework that drives defense institutions to develop. Rather, power is concentrated in a small body of
officials, thereby precluding critical thinking, effective coordination,
and consensus-building. Due to centralized decision-making without a
designated official whose sole function is to optimize daily functioning
of civilian or military organizations, these organizations are also all but
incapable of performing effective staff work when judged by Western
standards. As James Sherr of Chatham House so presciently observes:
As in other post-communist states, few and far between are those who
ask themselves how policies, programmes and directives should be implemented. The vastly safer and almost universal practice is to await orders
about how orders should be implemented. If directives are not to become
conversation pieces, their authors must walk them through the system themselves. Not surprisingly, the result is a system overmanned, overworked and
largely inert.14

As a result, there is no consistent management to ensure staff
coordination, press decision-making downwards, and allow only the
most critical policy issues to be addressed at the minister or the chief
of defense level. By allowing, and indeed encouraging, all decisionmaking to remain with the minister, the chief of defense, and within
their collegia, no decision is too minor to be raised to them and modern
command and management concepts cannot take hold.
Even the widespread practice of designating deputy ministers and
deputy chiefs of defense to run the organization still breaks this principle. These individuals cannot be honest brokers in the staffing process
while being members of the leadership team. On the military side of
the equation, even the seemingly advanced and reformed Polish defense
institution has yet to embrace this concept: two deputies support the
Polish chief of defense, but there is no chief of staff. This inability to
divide command from management in Poland is remarkable considering
it was a key reform principle identified as early as 1992.15 Confusing
hybrid models, such as the Czech armed forces who have both a first
deputy chief of defense as well as a deputy chief of defense and chief of
staff, also exist.
Conflating these two responsibilities produces yet another practice
whereby commanders and staff officers are not allowed to develop
properly. While the concentration of power may suggest an illusion of
control, in reality, the system incentivizes officers to become micromanagers. Officers are taught by examples of senior officers to focus inward
13 Regarding the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense see, Vaidotas Urbelis and Tomas Urbonas,
“The Challenges of Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The Case
of Lithuania,” in Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards, eds.
Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster (London: Palgrave, 2002), 117–18. For
more on Georgia’s structure of the ministry of defence and joint staff, see Ministry of Defence
of Georgia, Georgia, Strategic Defence Review, 2013–2016 (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defence, 2013), 22, 23.
14 James Sherr, “Civil-Democratic Control of Ukraine’s Armed Forces: To What End? By What
Means?,” in Army and State in Postcommunist Europe, eds. David Betz and John Löwenhardt (London:
Frank Cass, 2001), 74.
15 Andrew A. Michta, The Soldier-Citizen: The Politics of the Polish Army after Communism (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 50–53.

38

Parameters 47(1) Spring 2017

on the organization as opposed to looking outward and thinking critically and creatively.16 These expectations cripple strategic-level thinking,
thereby inhibiting thoughts of creating a future for the organization and
dooming the armed services to live always in the past.17

Centralizing Financial Decision-Making

When the Cold War ended, every former post-Communist country
found itself in a state of economic crisis. Strong pressure to decrease
defense spending was accompanied by an outbreak of confl icts in
Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, and Bessarabia, which further stressed
defense budgets. None of these defense institutions, with the exception of the Yugoslav Territorial Defense Force, found themselves with
a heritage of a modern defense planning nor a financial management
system that would enable them to conduct even the most rudimentary
defense planning.18
With a universal focus on effecting civilian control and shrinking
bloated Communist-era defense budgets, the fastest way to seize civilian
control of the armed forces was by removing budget responsibilities from
general staffs. Newly elected political leaders and civilian defense officials
centralized all financial decision-making within ministries of defense. In
the case of the Yugoslav armed forces, whose commanders possessed
their own budgets and spending authorities, the subsequent centralization of finances constituted a major step backwards. Conversely, the
Czech defense budget circa 1993 was almost incomprehensible to civilian
government officials who were challenged to ascertain actual spending.
In 1996, then-Czech Minister of Defense Vilem Holan launched a major
reform that included the introduction of the “revolutionary” concept of
double-entry bookkeeping management.19
Thus, the immediate task confronting early democratic reformers
was to find effective financial management methods to stop defense
institutions from spending public funds needed elsewhere. What began
in the early years of democracy to make defense “fit” its budget has
become an all but impossible task. Notwithstanding reductions in force
structure and personnel, retaining needless infrastructure continues to
waste money. To appreciate the enormity of this task, upon independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2006, Montenegro
took possession of 12,000 tons of munitions and 242 pieces of real estate
and 1,450 buildings it still owned in 2013.20
Established with Western technical assistance, planning, programming, and budgeting system directorates placed unrelenting pressure on
centralizing financial decision-making that has only increased following
16 Agnieszka Gogolewska, “Problems Confronting Civilian Democratic Control in Poland,” in
Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and Institutional Change, eds. Hans Born, Marina
Caparini, Karl W. Haltiner, and Jürgen Kuhlmann (New York: Routledge, 2006), 101.
17 The author is indebted to retired Colonel Vladimir Milenski, Bulgarian Army, for suggesting
this most insightful observation.
18 See Glenn E. Curtis, ed., Yugoslavia: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress, 1992), 252; and Milojica Pantelic, “The System and Organization of
National Defense,” Yugoslav Survey 10, no. 2 (1969): 6.
19 Jeffrey Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil-Military
Relations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 35.
20 Montenegro Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review 2013 (Podgorica: Ministry of
Defence, 2013), 19.
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the 2008 crisis—for example, Slovenia’s defense budget was savaged by
a 34.6 percent reduction from 2007 to 2015.21 Historically, these directorates have effectively maintained their own bureaucratic autonomy,
though they have been particularly ineffective at translating any existing
defense policy priorities and plans into measurable defense outcomes.22
This hypercentralized financial decision-making has produced practices
in which the general staffs of such nations as Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine,
and Serbia conduct force planning absent financial inputs.
It is not surprising that few of these defense institutions have been
capable of producing or executing viable defense plans. Thus, a unique
managerial pathology has emerged throughout the region: ministries of
defense not only manage all aspects of finances but also do so without
considering whether outcomes are achievable. Instead, salaries, pensions, military hospitals, and social welfare benefits—such as spas and
even a ski resort in Bulgaria—have become default priorities that have
produced under-staffed units, limited flying hours, and reduced ship
days at sea.

Undermining Commanders

The confluence of the Communist trinity of legacy concepts inhibits
armed forces from developing leaders and fostering an environment
for encouraging well-rounded, professional commanders to emerge.
Even in reformed defense institutions, such as in Slovenia, the chief of
defense controls no more than five percent of the force’s budget and
the midterm defense program restricts battalion commanders’ abilities
to manage finances to meet assigned missions and tasks.23 Thus, junior
leaders are not expected nor groomed to understand the relationship
between fiscal management and force outcomes necessary for mid- and
senior-grade postings.
Ministries of defense even determine personnel numbers and present
them to chiefs of services as de facto decisions as well as regularly prohibit these senior leaders from moving money from one category to
another to produce outcomes. Even worse, commanders who should
have the best appreciation of which leaders have both performed well
in stressful command postings and have the potential for succeeding in
more challenging command environments are not permitted to influence personnel management decisions comparable to Western practices.
Such decision-making, again, is highly centralized in general staffs
and ministries of defense. Arguably, the authority of the chief of defense
in Slovenia is diluted since his list of officer promotion recommendations is first vetted by the Intelligence and Security Service before being
forwarded to the human resource management directorate, a practice
one Slovenian general associates with control mechanisms and an
ignorance of military advice. Legislation even enables untrained and
21 Slovenia Ministry of Defense, NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2015/16, ANNEX 1.
AC/281-WP(2016)0024 (R), (Ljubljana: Ministry of Defense, n.d.), 1–4. For more on US assistance
programs in the area, see US Department of Defense, FY 2010 Annual Report on Cost Assessment
Activities (Washington, DC: DoD, 2011), 20, appendix 2.
22 Thomas-Durell Young, “Is the US’s PPBS Applicable to European Post-Communist
Defense Institutions?,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 5 (October-November 2016): 68–77, doi:10.1080
/03071847.2016.1253382.
23 Branimir Furlan, “Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness: Slovenian Case,” Armed Forces
and Society 39, no. 3 (2012): 442, doi:10.1177/0095327X12459167.
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unqualified individuals to become commanders or take staff postings
thereby undermining the basic concept of military professionalism.24
This pervasive practice of negative civilian control undermines
the professional growth of the officer corps by denying demanding
command and staff postings. Equally, these practices preclude officers
from acquiring a full appreciation of all aspects of the operation of
the armed forces, particularly their financial implications and realities.
In short, management of the armed forces is really a misnomer while
administrating is clearly observable in the absence of experienced,
professional military advice. The persistence of the Communist trinity
of legacy concepts is nothing short of scandalous.
Despite the claim that such legacy practices constitute “national
business” exempt from allied discussions, these practices produce senior
leaders who have not been exposed to the same professionally challenging assignments as their Western counterparts: this fact ultimately creates
problems in allied commands and multinational forces. Succinctly, the
alliance should be interested in developing senior commanders who are
capable of controlling the financial and human resources necessary for
combined operations.
To be sure, there are always exceptions to the rule, but one
cannot ignore the possibility that limiting these officers from the
same professional challenges enjoyed by their Western counterparts
produces an officer corps with stunted professionalism. Equally, in lieu
of healthy civil-military relations, one finds an unbalanced relationship
substituting uninformed and risk-adverse administration for military
professionalism.

Implications and Solutions

Arguably, Western and legacy command concepts are antithetical;
however, the Communist trinity of legacy concepts—collective
decision-making; conflating leadership, command, and management;
and hypercentralized decision-making—undermines the very basis of
the Western definition of command. Absent a change in alliance policy
and the selection of allied commanders, only time will tell how the stark
conceptual rift between Western and residual legacy practices will affect
the ability of commanders from these armed forces to operate within
the alliance’s integrated military command structure. How have 25
years of cooperation with NATO and its nations’ armed forces missed
addressing this important challenge? Answers to this question are more
easily found in both Western and Eastern policy failures.
The Western approach of providing assistance to new partners
and allies has stressed technical solutions, often using Western models
that have failed to address the two antithetical concepts of command.
Moreover, Western nations’ training and professional military educational courses, which expose students to modern warfare, leadership,
and management approaches, have only been partially successful.
Appreciation (and one wonders, recognition) that this knowledge is
highly contextualized and cannot easily be exported to different national
and organizational environments has been lacking. As David Ralston
24 Ibid., 441–42.
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writes in the context of exporting European army models in the nineteenth century, “The reformers were to learn, often to their dismay, that
the introduction of European forms and methods into their military
establishments would sooner or later oblige their societies to undergo
internal adjustments which were by no means trivial.”25
Simply put, the conceptual difference between Western and Eastern
defense and military concepts are so antithetical the adoption of the
former is all but impossible without retiring the entire conceptual basis
of legacy defense institutions. Even when legacy armed forces adopt
some key Western-influenced reforms, junior and noncommissioned
officers voice complaints that NATO procedures are faithfully followed
during operations but legacy concepts prevail at home. Many young
officers and NCOs, including many with operations experience, chafe
at this reality.
The existence of this major differentiation in the concept of
command clearly needs wider understanding and attention by all NATO
nations. The traditional solution of “reform” needs to be rethought. Like
it or not, past assistance policies and programs have neither identified
this conceptual command divide nor produced any effective methods
to address it. This challenge to the Western alliance simply cannot be
addressed at the technical level alone. To be sure, Western training and
professional military education courses have their place. What needs to
be acknowledged by senior officials in both Western and Eastern capitals
is the conceptual divide in command, as well as other areas, is due to
subtle factors that can only be addressed with a deep understanding of
organizational sociological, conceptual, and political characteristics.
To be blunt, only Eastern allies at the level of presidents and prime
ministers—officials who need to accept the urgency of effecting changes
in how commanders are groomed, are selected for stressful and growing
assignments, and are expected to command—can successfully address
the contrast. After all, in any military organization, command is the
“coin of the realm” and changing its basic characteristic will strike at the
very institutional soul and enabling culture of an armed force. Such an
initiative will not be easily accepted, particularly in the more profound
legacy-leaning defense institutions where Western and legacy concepts
of professionalism are antithetical and therefore incapable of coexisting
(see table 2).26 Thus, senior Western political and military officials need
to be prepared to exert sharp and consistent political pressure on their
counterparts for the comprehensive exculpation of legacy concepts and
assumptions as well as their replacement with modern Western concepts. Assuredly, these will be politically painful, fundamental changes.

25 David B. Ralston, Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques
and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1900),
173.
26 Michael H. Clemmesen, “Integration of New Alliance Members: The Intellectual-Cultural
Dimension,” Defense Analysis 15, no. 3 (December 1999): 261–72, doi:10.1080/713604685; and
Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed
Forces (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 108–53.
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Table 2. The Professional Conceptual Divide27
Western concepts

Practical
Critical thinking is required
Decentralized execution
Commanders are empowered
Results oriented
Future oriented
Low social context
Serve the troops
Low power distance
Low uncertainty avoidance
Lying is unacceptable
Failure is part of learning

Eastern concepts
Theoretical
Iron discipline rules
Centralized execution
Commanders only execute
Process oriented
Past obsessed
High social context
Mistreat soldiers (Dedovshchina)
High power distance
High uncertainty avoidance
Lying is not a sin
Failure is never an option, but
a shame and disgrace

Conclusion

In summary, command as defined and practiced in many Central and
Eastern European defense institutions, and expressed as a Communist
trinity of legacy concepts, could not be more foreign and antithetical
to Western approaches. This premise should come as no surprise
since communism’s absolute centralization of power never entrusted
lower officials with decision-making authority. Bereft of responsibility
and accountability, the legacy definition of command constitutes
absolute power over individuals, which likely explains why most newly
independent republics systematically compromise commanders’ abilities
to command. Largely absent in the region is a timely evolution of laws,
policies, incentives, and control mechanisms that ensure the responsible
exercise of command.
Yet, these concepts and practices are too limited by the continued
practices of collective decision-making; conflating leadership, command,
and management; and hypercentralized decision-making to be effectively
adopted, particularly regarding financial authorities and human resource
management. Overcoming these legacy concepts and comprehensively
replacing them with their Western counterparts presents no small
challenge. An encouraging first step would be NATO nations’ universal
and honest acknowledgement of the challenge and their commitment
to addressing these atavistic legacies with deliberate and systematic new
methods to effect change.
The only way to undertake this challenge is to place the solution
where it belongs, at the highest political level. Thus, the default of longstanding policies and programs that address defense reform as a military
problem addressed via technical assistance programs alone needs to be
fundamentally reviewed to develop new approaches based on a deep
understanding of individual cultures and organizational sociologies.
The solution to reforming legacy command concepts will be found in
growing and empowering commanders.

27 Adapted from Young, “Impediments to Reform.”

